Monday, December 29, 2014
Throughout academia, ‘cognitive’ is used ambiguously, if not ambivalently, to pertain to (1) mental phenomena or issues of inquiry, (2) conceptuality or domain of comprehension, or/and (3) epistemic issues or range of representational relevance.
This 3-fold is homologous with philosophical discourse on concepts alone: Concepts are standardly regarded as (1) capabilities, as (2) so-called Fregean senses, or as (3) representations.
This is homlogous with Habermas’ 3-fold model of lifeworld pragmatics (though I don’t expect that to seem evident; a keynote is that what really holds us together is conceptual).
And the homologies continue, really. So, what’s the nature of such 3-folding of a person(1) relating(2) to the world(3)?
I have the answer! But a simple (unexplicated) rendering(3) of foldness(2) itself wouldn’t seem obvious(1).
Anyway, logocentrism conceals the ontogenesis of such abstracted differentiability.
Monday, December 22, 2014
My Dec. 21, Habermasian posting, “drawing thought beyond transcendentalism,” explains itself well enough. Today, I’ve sketched a context for moving beyond that into how Habermas’s work could be progressively applied to working for the good of our times, going forward (rather than being overly attached to the past). But I’ll return to that next year. Presently, I’m having fun with my purely philosophical venture.
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
“Oh, how cute!”
“Well, it’s still a toddler. You should have been here just a few years back. Just wait a few more years.”
What is a “mind”? As it goes now, a recent Science article titled “A Mind of Its Own” is subheaded: “Novel neuromorphic chips and software should provide robots with unriveled perceptual skills.”
Forget computational neuroscience (trying to model wetware perception, which is the result of eonic biogenic self-sorting, then intelligent self-selectivity which outstripped natural selection, yet is replicably encoded in the [regulatory] genome). The Game is neurocomputational beings (with quantum computational capacity allegorized in human terms). And the meta-Game is conceptual design of computational complexity—if not conceiving autogenic algorithmicity (which must remain always susceptible to human halting).