Monday, December 29, 2014
a 3-fold ambiguity of ‘cognitivity’
Throughout academia, ‘cognitive’ is used ambiguously, if not ambivalently, to pertain to (1) mental phenomena or issues of inquiry, (2) conceptuality or domain of comprehension, or/and (3) epistemic issues or range of representational relevance.
This 3-fold is homologous with philosophical discourse on concepts alone: Concepts are standardly regarded as (1) capabilities, as (2) so-called Fregean senses, or as (3) representations.
This is homlogous with Habermas’ 3-fold model of lifeworld pragmatics (though I don’t expect that to seem evident; a keynote is that what really holds us together is conceptual).
And the homologies continue, really. So, what’s the nature of such 3-folding of a person(1) relating(2) to the world(3)?
I have the answer! But a simple (unexplicated) rendering(3) of foldness(2) itself wouldn’t seem obvious(1).
Anyway, logocentrism conceals the ontogenesis of such abstracted differentiability.
Two relevant discussions are: “‘I understand’” and “emergingness in relation to ordinary conceptuality.”