a coherence conception of truth as global localityof ultimate value

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20^th century coherence theories of truth (which aren’t tenable) might be appropriately read as plausible intuitions of theories of validity containing a conception of true statements and other kinds of “truth,” like normative validity and genuineness (or sincerity, to use Bernard Williams’s preferred term in his bi-modal theory of truth as a matter of accuracy and sincerity). In any case, I find old coherence theories of truth interesting as promising miscarriages.

Yet, a tenable theory of coherence is only as good as the discursive cohering that designs. That might imply a sense of “the” Good which is discursive, but doesn’t imply that an appropriate theory of “the” Good is about discursiveness! Philosophy itself might be about discursiveness, but what we want backing (warranting) a conception of “the” Good is, I think, a conception of valuing that integrally serves Our flourishing, which is individuational, communitarian, vastly systemic (hyperNetted, politically economic, environmental, etc.), and evolving (a disursive notion which would be also about its own discursive“ness”).

meaning of life

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The meaning of one’s life? A meaning?—for one’s life?

A distinction can be made between meaning and significance—or literal meaning of something and a broader/deeper sense of it—narrow scale and wide scale. Doesn’t one have in mind, by using the phrase “meaning of life,” a concern for a significance of a life? meaningfulness?

a note on objectivity vs. factuality vs. normativity

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I sent the following note today to Brian Leiter, Professor of Law and Philosophy, U. of Texas, Austin:

Professor Leiter,

You know, Jürgen Habermas has received a lot of attention in philosophy, including philosophy of law (e.g., the anthology Habermas on Law and Democracy, 1998, oriented around his Between Facts and Norms). So, when you write, in "Leiter Reports," that "I don't think much of Habermas as a philosopher-—who does?" (11/06/03), I think: Gee, what's wrong with me? 

for love of enhancing humanity

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I posted a note on philosophy of higher education, as I'm quite committed to that context of practicality, as I begin a new era of conceptual adventuring that doesn't pretend to seem practical (but is so).

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“How does a naturalist make sense of the meaning, magic, and mystery of life?,” asks Owen Flanagan (Professor of Philosophy, Duke U.), in preface to The Really Hard Problem: meaning in a material world, 2007. “How does one say truthful and enchanting things about being human? It is not clear. [In the following book,] I make an attempt to explain how we can make sense and meaning of our lives given that we are material beings living in a material world. The picture I propose is naturalistic and enchanting. Or so I hope....We can adopt different legitimate attitudes toward the truth about our nature and our predicament. I recommend optimistic realism. Joyful optimistic realism. Life can be precious and funny. And one doesn't need to embrace fantastical stories—unbecoming to historically mature beings—about our nature and prospects to make it so.” [pp. xii-xiii]

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how many moments of silence we need

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The Code.

Most directly, this pertains to engagement with humanizing medical practice. But the larger issue—my interest especially—is the example this provides for (1) the importance of issues of empathy in the conceptualization of care, (2) the boundaries of the medical model of care for health care generally, (3) the applicability of health care modeling for scaling care in public life, and (4) the importance of care for philosophical ethics.

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How is appreciation related to intrinsic value?

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• What's appreciation as such? How does it relate to implied high perceptibility? What is high perceptibility?

• Is deservingness in valuation no more than what's addressed standardly through the issue of "desert"?

• Must the meaning of 'high valuation' derive from a sense of intrinsic value?

Much more is tacitly put to question in "your highness," e.g., "caring," "genuinely sophisticated culture," "healthy market".

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honoring The Flow of discerning lives

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I have more in mind with the title above than is addressed by its occasion: my overreading of Habermas' article on journalism and the market, and what I did discuss involved claims that (to me) call for explication—which was tacitly a self-provocation for doing some follow-up, particularly relative to the importance of "flow" (link below)—which is no impulsive or vague notion!

Beyond that—I came to realize—I wanted to share some thoughts on (2) the ontogenic basis of genuine valuation, (3) the deliberative consumer, (4) institutional enabling of deliberative vitality, and (5) think some more about "discursive vitality."