discursive living • gary e. davis • berkeley: mysteries of being in discursive dwelling

September 1, 2025

This is follow-up after “Heidegger was not a ’mystical’ philosopher.”

On April 1, Erik Kuravsky announced to a Heidegger discussion group that The Mystery of Being was forthcoming. I wrote to him, requesting his “Introduction,” and I promised to “comment thoughtfully.” He kindly sent that to me, plus his chapter for the book—and a couple of other essays; very gracious of him.

July 21, Erik announced the book again at the discussion group, showing the cover with the book’s description.

The next day, I (“GD” below) commented on the book description, and Erik (“EK” hereafter) replied the next day. [Below, I’m adding a few orienting comments in brackets.]

July 22

A problem with this project is evident at the level of the book description.

On the one hand, John Caputo emphasizes, in his 1986 reissuing of his book on “the mystical element,” that “Heidegger is separated by an abyss from mysticism…. I meant to stress [by] ‘element’ that it is ‘only an analogy.’”

On the other hand, the book seeks “inquiry [into] the mystical essence inherent in Heidegger's thought.”

July 23

EK: Perhaps reading what John Caputo himself has to say about this project would help resolve the problems that you seem to have.

GD: —which is not available yet. But nothing he says changes the fact that there is no "mystical essence inherent in Heidegger's thought." The book isn't described as inquiry into that belief (for which there is no credible evidence); rather as inquiry into that given projection.

Elliot Wolfson, quoted on the back cover, would welcome a belief that there is “the [?] mystical dimension in Heidegger's thought,” because he’s a scholar of mysticism—one who, by the way, believes that Heidegger is antisemitic (Duplicity of Heidegger’s Shadow, 2018) and evidently now wants to absorb the good side of split-off Heidegger into Kabbalah (_...Hidden Gnosis…, 2024), and regards your book as proceeding “under the taxonomy of philosophical mysticism.” Having indebtedness to one’s past interests is not constitutive for inquiring minds. In particular, Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is not Eckhart’s.

EK: I think there is a mystical essence to his or any real philosophy, but only in the sense of "mystical" proposed in the introduction of this book, which is not equal to the more restricted sense Caputo discussed in the book you mentioned. The current book does not intend to categorize Heidegger as being this or that-e.g mysticism-but questions the very meaning of what this category attempts to express, and particularly its traditional separation from philosophy as such.

GD: So, you're not going to share what Caputo (the very theological philosopher) has to say about the book. Publisher embargo, I guess. 

And not really relevant, given that the book isn’t about Heidegger at all, which is fine: Bring Heidegger into interest in mysticism, into “question[ing] the very meaning of what this category attempts to express" ("Introduction," and other quoting here).

But don’t project that Heideggrer's thinking is mystical (“…the mystical essence inherent in Heidegger's thought”; ), because it doesn't have valid sense—and, by the way, being "mystical" isn’t relevant to contemporary, professional philosophy. 

 It’s odd that you start off indicating “The question of Heidegger’s relation to ‘mysticism’ largely depends on what we understand by this term” [EK "Introduction"], but then don’t promptly address how you understand the term. You get into a discussion of what mysticism is not, then write about technology, Chuang Tzu, and stipulate that there is “the mystical in Heidegger” prior to getting to the point.  

 But then, you do get to the point: You want something which “at best{—at best?—] always remain imprecise…without reducing it to something fully comprehensible.” You want to apply the term to “any doctrine that implies the existence of a reality beyond familiar, everyday experience.” Well, that’s what any engagement in conceptual inquiry involves, which any introductory philosophy course would address.  

 Otherwise, your desire looks like diversion (absorption, insertion) of a stipulated “Heidegger” into “the essential connection between [his proximally expressed] vision and both religious…and non-religious…paths to the mystery.” “the” mystery? No, your stage of understanding mystery is to be connected to "Heidegger"—which is fine. We're all at some stage of understanding. But how about Heidegger's really? That involves close textual engagement (not yet apt for an "Introduction," but neither is stipulation of "mystical" connection). 

 “This book proposes a factual unity between the two terms,” ‘mysticism’ and ‘philosophy’. Well, fine. "Factual": truth-functionality? Heidegger can’t help you there, because factuality is shareably evidentiary in reasonable terms. You want religionist guidance (“…an experiential revelation”) toward everything. You’re a student of religionism. 

 Actually, Heidegger’s relation to ‘mysticism’ (the term) depends on how he understands the notion, which is that he doesn’t deal with it at all in his own thinking. In particular, he doesn't understand Gelassenheit in any sense of ‘mysticism’.  

 Heidegger’s question of being can be precisely engaged. “[I]ts mysterious nature” can be clarified, relative to one’s actual questioning. It’s an existential question. “You” [a person] ask[s] it sensibly relative to your own questioning, your own present approach to questioning, your own learning curve. Mystery can be resolved relative to specific questioning. 

 Your desire is want of “a particular quality that can potentially shape any intelligible aspect of human existence.” So, you’re interested in constitutive qualia? That looks like a vague sense of capability to conceptualize. There's lots to say about that. It doesn't require Transcendental Illusions.  

 To understand ‘mystical’ relative to a “performative aspect” of narrative is about the rhetorical dimension of language use, which is common for literary studies. There’s nothing essentially nebulous about that. You just have to build skill in narrative analysis. 

 So, I'll stop here with your “Introductrion" for now. Your interests are genuinely interesting. But it’s not going to credibly find any “mystical element” in Heidegger's thinking. You're asserting what developmental psychologist Vygotsky called "the zone of proximal development," which is an ordinary notion in educational psychology. You're apparently mystifying your current horizon.

 I have my horizon, too. But there's nothing mystical about it. I welcome the endlessness of conceptual venturing. May it dissolve my current horizon! May topping a hill reveal another hill to scale. I love learning!

 [Later the same day I added:]

To others: Here’s most of an email sent to Erik yesterday [with {July}insertions]: 

 Association of Heidegger with mysticism was a keynote for Heidegger losing his teaching job, 1945, due to Karl Jaspers [arguing that MH was nazi]. Such association has been used by later writers to invalidly associate Heidegger with nazism (e.g., Charles Baumbach, Heidegger's Roots, Richard Wolin, Thomas Sheehan). Also, such association has been used to invalidly incriminate Heidegger as antisemitic [e.g., Elliot Wolfson, mentioned in another comment here today]. 

So, a scholastic venture into the association is not innocent, especially since Heidegger overtly dissociated himself from mysticism (which you…evidently ignore). Your motives are clearly genuine. But the association of Heidegger with mysticism has a bad history. 

 A scholar should distinguish: 

 (a) non-mystical interest in mysticism as part of inquiry into the history of thought—thus being clear about how the thinking is itself non-mystical; [Heidegger had interest, early in his career, but even then, the thinking itself was non-mystical.] 

 (b) [claims about] "seeing" mysticism in Heidegger's thought (which is invalid and diagnosably symptomatic of misreading), and 

 (c) regarding Heidegger's thinking as fundamentally mystical (symptomatic of one's level of thinking), which is widely accepted by non-academic readers who comfortably avoid post-metaphysicalist Heidegger's path into post-theologicist (post-spiritualist) thinking because [MH’s thinking is] supposedly, according to "authority," irrational.

July 24

[The next day, another member of the discussion group commented:]

MG: May I suggest waiting to read a book before writing a critique about it based on associations to its subtitle. Note the title. Mystery and mysticism are not the same. You will find something on that in my chapter in the book. And so we have here, I think, really just yet more in the tradition of Schneeberger, Farías, Faye, Wolin and Payen. How wearisome.

GD: No, MG, I wrote based on Erik's "Introduction," which he suggested I read.

Based on a close examination of how Erik understands 'mystical', one can then address the difference between mystery and mystical (though I didn’t completely discuss his Introduction).

You are so correct that they are not the same, but Erik evidently wants to regard mystery as ultimately mystical, whereas normal philosophical work (especially phenomenological) would not. I’m ready to see that I’m mistaken about that [i.e., what Erik is arguing], in light of more readng. But the first half of his “Introduction” is quite substantive about what he takes ‘mystical” to preferrably mean to him. Also, it’s notable that his chapter 10 (which I also have) focuses on Meister Eckhart, [a chapter] which I haven’t read yet [though I'm familiar with Eckhart], but that looks like mysticism on steroids projected into “Heidegger.”

Anyway, one can consider the notion of "The Mystery of Being," which I will argue misunderstands the existential character of being in Heidegger's work; and misunderstands the dependence of mystery on what is mysterious.

Consider the overwhelming array of all that is mysterious. There is no singularity of it all as the mystery other than through mystical conceptions.

But mystical conceptions, I will argue, are supernaturalist, "spiritual"list, and immunize the believer from accountability for evaluations. "Find" Heidegger to be mystical, then "finding" him antisemitic (Elliott Wolfson and others) might be easy, such as with Faye, Wolin, etc., as you indicate.

Send me your chapter. I promise to read graciously. As I’ve said elsewhere, it’s inevitable that persons read differently, at least because each brings special interests to a reading. What’s unacceptable, though, is to misread in the interest of incrimination, which so much “Heidegger” scholarship has done.

gedcorres-note@yahoo.com [That’s my standard contact address, by the way. MG didn't respond nor offer his chapter.]

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[same day]

EK: Dear Gary (if I may),

I understand that it might be difficult to grasp the full scope of the book based solely on the available introduction. I hope the following clarifications will help:

1. The book is not about Heidegger’s conscious relationship to mysticism, his thoughts on it, or whether his work should be categorized under "mysticism" in libraries. It is not a history of ideas, nor does it aim to compare Heidegger to specific mystics to argue that they share the same ideas (e.g., *Gelassenheit*).

2. The central theme of the book is not "mysticism" per se, but rather "mystery" (*Geheimnis*), which is a recurring and fundamental concept in Heidegger’s thought across all stages of his philosophy.

3. The introduction provides a clear definition of mysticism, which you may have overlooked. This definition, drawn from Mamardashvili, is unique to the aims of this project and not derived from existing literature. The book argues that there is a "mystical" essence to human existence in the sense that it is possible to transform one’s mode of Being in ways that are irreducible to psychological or objectively analyzable terms. The very *sophia* of *philosophia* pertains to the attainment of such transformation. While this transformation is often interpreted in religious terms, the association between mystery (of human transformation and of Being itself) and religion is most naturally expressed in the term "mysticism." However, my aim is to "de-mystify" mysticism—not to make it less mysterious, but to show that this mystery is ontological and philosophical. This does not diminish its mystery, nor does it invalidate its religious expressions, which can remain both true and philosophical, albeit in a different language.

4. The "performative" element discussed in the book has nothing to do with how the term is commonly used today. I refer to the ontological performativity of philosophy. Philosophy is not merely about generating new concepts or intellectual understanding—these are only tools for something deeper: the transformation of one’s existence, which is irreducible to anything else.

5. The mystery cannot be "resolved." To suggest otherwise reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Heidegger. The mystery must be "kept" and "faced," not "resolved." To speak of resolving the mystery reduces it to a puzzle, which is entirely different from *the* mystery.

6. If contemporary philosophy fails to engage with the mystery (and, by extension, with what is real in mysticism), then it is philosophy itself that suffers.

7. We may disagree on these profound questions about the nature of philosophy, but this is not the place to debate them.

8. Regarding the structure of the book:

• The first part examines what Heidegger embraced from theology and mystical traditions—not in terms of specific concepts he adopted, but in terms of the meaning of human existence and its possibilities.

• The second part argues that traditional mysticism, due to its metaphysical nature, may distort the very mystery it seeks to express. Heidegger, on the other hand, offers a way to think about the mystery beyond traditional mysticism (though not necessarily in opposition to it).

• The third part focuses on language, showing how Heidegger’s understanding of language enables a deeper engagement with the mystery—one that surpasses what traditional mysticism achieves.

• The fourth part explores the performative nature of philosophy and thinking, emphasizing their role in facilitating transformations of consciousness, one’s openness to Being, and modes of knowing and feeling that are more fundamental than conceptuality.

• The final part delves into Heidegger’s poetic expressions of the mystery, illustrating how the simple, the everyday, and the ordinary are profoundly mysterious in themselves, without invoking magical realms or entities.

9. Lastly, I don’t believe it is in good taste to critique a book you haven’t yet read. That said, I am happy to address any specific questions you may have about the introduction that is available to you.

Best wishes,

Erik

July 24

GD: Your long comments are very informative about your book. [Below I quote EK’s ennumerated comments, not new comment by him.] 

 I’m with you on avoiding bad taste. I didn’t critique your book. I discussed your sense of ‘mystical’ in your “Introduction.” How could you read otherwise? But recall that you prospected the full conception of the book in your “Call for Papers” [2023]and—if I recall correctly—you assert the intentions of your book in your “Introduction,” which introductions standardly do. Nonetheless, I stayed close to quoting what you wrote about mysticism, not the entire book. 

 Though I didn’t indicate at all that I was trying to understand “the full scope of the book,” thanks for your discussion (beyond saying what the book is not—point 1—which doesn’t relate to anything I wrote). 

 EK: 2. The central theme of the book is…’mystery’ (Geheimnis), which is a recurring and fundamental concept in Heidegger’s thought across all stages of his philosophy. 

 GD: Good to know. But note that you devote a lot of sentences to situating your theme that “mystical essence [is] inherent in Heidegger's thought.” That is a false claim. 

 EK: 3. [You provide] a clear definition of mysticism,…” 

 GD:… which you don’t reiterate in your comments yesterday. But yesterday, I addressed in quoted terms your asserted sense of ‘mystical’. Your’re not today addressing that, other than to say that yours is “unique.”

 EK: …there is a "mystical" essence to human existence in the sense that it is possible to transform one’s mode of Being in ways that are irreducible to psychological or objectively analyzable terms.  

 GD: Yeah, that’s called creative self-reflection and, if necessary, psychotherapy. It’s commonly articulated in artistic work and clinical work. It’s common fare in the humanities. The “...’mystical’ essence” you refer to was clear in the passages from you which I quoted yesterday: what is “at best [—at best?—] always…imprecise…without reducing it to something fully comprehensible….”  

 GD: Any creative person will admit that what they’re doing is drawn by yet-to-be clarified appeal. But the work of art, as with scientific research and healthy flourishing, is to articulate, to get clear, for the sake of furthering that creativity or inquiry. There’s nothing mystical about it. In psychotherapy, the therapeutic alliance seeks clarity for the sake of future healthy engagement. Articulation inspires. 

 As I noted yesterday, you want to apply the term to "any doctrine that implies the existence of a reality beyond familiar, everyday experience." Well—as I noted yesterday—that’s what any engagement in conceptual inquiry involves, which any introductory philosophy course would address. 

 EK: The very sophia of philosophia pertains to the attainment of such transformation.

GD: The -sophia pertains to education, which is always enriching, enlightening, and enabling. There’s nothing mystical about educational theory or a poetic goddess of wisdom (Sophia). Indeed, the sophists were common teachers (albeit too often resorting to sophistry). 

 EK: …my aim is to "de-mystify" mysticism—…to show that this mystery is ontological and philosophical.  

 GD: So, you’re metaphysicalist, very contrary to Heidegger: Ontology is the mythical conceptuality of Greek metaphysics. Heidegger sought to de-mystify ontological talk in terms of the conceptuality of understanding and keynote concepts of worldly existence. Note that he only talked about ontology as part of getting beyond that mythology through de-constructing classical metaphysics. 

 You clearly are concerned to keep your interests congruent with religious talk. You’re a religionist, just as I indicated, but you’re wanting a new spiritualism (your unique perspective on Mamardashvili?). 

 EK: 4. The "performative" element discussed in the book has nothing to do with how the term is commonly used today.  

 GD: Sorry to know, because rhetoric is a rich field of engagement, going back to Aristotle, the topic of Heidegger’s lecturing while writing Being and Time, which was not about ontology, but about Arisotle’s “conceptality.” 

 EK: I refer to the ontological performativity of philosophy.  

 GD: Performativity in Anglo-European philosophy is not ontological in its focus on linguistic conceptuality. From Ryle through Wittgenstein and Austin to Searle, performativity in philosophy is a mode of theory of action. 

 EK: Philosophy is not merely about generating new concepts or intellectual understanding—these are only tools for something deeper: the transformation of one’s existence, which is irreducible to anything else.  

 GD: Yes. Philosophy is about conceptual work which is educational and enlightening for students’ and scholars’ lives. However, it is reducible to standard issues of meaning, value, knowing, feeling, and other primary aspects of being a person.  

 EK: 5. The mystery cannot be "resolved."  

 GD: As I indicated, mystery relative to a specific person’s questioning can be resolved. This is why we have philosophy classes and tutorials. [Actually, a mystery is an epistemic matter, among matters of being a person in a life which is also about values and goods, along with epistemic appeals.] 

 EK: To suggest otherwise reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Heidegger.  

 GD: No, his teaching career is all about learning to think effectively about dilemmas. He’s fundamentally about the event of teaching, which is why so many of his “ways not works” are lecture course transcripts. He's performing processes of astute reading and careful thinking.  

 EK: The mystery must be "kept" and "faced," not "resolved."  

 GD: Don’t worry. You’ll find a way to resolve things. 

 EK: To speak of resolving the mystery reduces it to a puzzle, which is entirely different from the mystery.  

 GD: No, to resolve a given mystery—always specifiable as to what it’s about—builds ability to resolve more-complex mysteries. New mysteries are opened through resolution of given ones. Any scientist or artist would agree.  

 EK: 6. If contemporary philosophy fails to engage with the mystery (and, by extension, with what is real in mysticism), then it is philosophy itself that suffers.  

 GD: But contemporary philosophy is not failing, though it's suffering budget reductions, like all of the humanities. And philosophy professors suffer a lot of foolishness from students' admirable explorations. 

 EK: 8. Regarding the structure of the book:… 

 GD: Again, thanks for that. 

 Best wishes to you, too. 

 Gary

July 25

[The next day I added, also quoting EK from yesterday:]

On The Structure Of The Book

Ideas conveyed by a narrative have worth apart from the object (the book) which they’re about. So, addressing ideas should not be mistaken for making presumptions about the book. Earlier, you seemed to mistake the former for being the latter (as has MG).

EK: The first part examines what Heidegger embraced from theology and mystical traditions…

GD: Embraced? That’s a self-oriented notion, containing the other. Heidegger would agree that he appropriated kinds of influences. There’s nothing theological or mystical in his thinking.

EK: … in terms of the meaning of human existence and its possibilities.

GD. Yes! Ereignis: enowning event of appropriation.

EK: - The second part argues that…. Heidegger,…offers a way to think about the mystery beyond traditional mysticism (though not necessarily in opposition to it).

GD: That is valuable.

EK: The third part focuses on…how Heidegger’s understanding of language enables a deeper engagement with the mystery—one that surpasses what traditional mysticism achieves.

GD: Valuable—except that Heidegger would not—and never does—refer to mystery as a singularity: the mystery. Your own comment yesterday, that mystery is a “recurring and fundamental concept in Heidegger’s thought across all stages of his philosophy” implies plurality: so many mysteries! Yes: a "concept in Heidegger's thought." Our shared worlds (plural) are full of mysteries. There is no singularity to it all. There is not the mystery of being, other than relative to someone's "the...," a rubric like “the mystery of X,” some topic or person or thing. Appreciating the plurality of mysteries calls for conceptions of evolving knowledge, value, and meaning which are in terms which are appropriate to the evolving pluralism in “play” over time among such plurality of persons' lives.

EK:- The fourth part explores the performative nature of philosophy and thinking, emphasizing their role in facilitating transformations of consciousness, one’s openness to Being, and modes of knowing and feeling that are more fundamental than conceptuality.

GD: Philosophy teaches thinking. Don’t mystify being educational. “Openness to being” is about actualizing one’s potential. It’s not Out There somewhere. It’s here, in there being one’s life. That, in a nutshell, is the point of Being and Time. “The” mystery, for you, is that philosophy is mystical, and mysticism can be made “philosophical.” How? That's your mystery. But for others, there are other mysteries. Gadamer spoke ultimately of “the Conversation of Humanity.” We are evolving. It has no singularity of being.

EK: - The final part delves into Heidegger’s poetic expressions of the mystery,…

GD: poetic expressions of thinking, always relative to worldliness, wordliness (communicative belonging together), and re-thinking key concepts. It is fundamentally about conceptuality as living language, grounding and advancing our belonging together through renewing cherished language.

EK: …illustrating how the simple, the everyday, and the ordinary are profoundly mysterious…

GD: profoundly bonding and significant in new ways. The “clearing” brings clarity which grounds us with potential future. But indeed…

EK: …without invoking magical realms or entities.

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[The same day, EK posted new comment:]

EK: Heidegger is constantly referring to the mystery. It is evident you never read Heidegger. Please stop spamming this post and do something more valuable with your life

GD: Excuse me?

July 26

[I added to my ending of yesterday:

Excuse me?

I believe the problem is the Facebook platform: My replies to others through the “comments” mechanism causes you to be notified of every reply [to others], as if I’m spamming.  

 Let me add, though, that the mystery of something being is a normal locution, whereas referring to the mystery of being is something else, implying the metaphysicalism, if not mysticism, which Heidegger sought to overcome. 

 In Being and Time, Time and Being, and On the Way to Language there is no reference to “the mystery of being.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, there are several references to the mystery of specific things, like I indicated as common [for referring to the mystery of something]. There is one reference to “the mystery of being” as a misrepresentation. In Contributions to Philosophy, there are several referemces to “the mystery” of specific concepts. 

 I know these things because I use digital copies of them all [i.e., all of those books]. 

 It’s in bad taste to say that I haven’t read Heidegger, after giving lots of time to doing normal discursive explorations in direct relation to claims about what Heidegger is doing, relative to your own text. 

 I don’t like saying the following, but if you’re not older than, say, 30 or so, I began reading Heidegger some 20+ years before you were born, and did my doctoral work in that vein similarly that long ago.

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EK didn’t reply.

But he has provided much material for more dwelling with the mystery of being drawn into philosophical engagements (e.g., again, Capobianco’s mystified reading of Heidegger).